DIFFUSING THE WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AGENDA: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF GENDER INEQUALITY ON THE CREATION OF NATIONAL ACTION PLANS

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Abstract

This paper investigates the factors that facilitate the diffusion of international norms to the domestic agenda, focusing on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). The inclusion of women in peace and security institutions results in increased state stability and human rights compliance, yet over half of all UN member states have not created National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement UNSCR 1325. The present study quantitatively tests the hypothesis that countries with higher levels of gender inequality are less likely to have NAPs compared to countries with lower levels of gender inequality. The analysis also included democratization and international embeddedness as control variables. Results revealed that the relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation in 2018 is statistically insignificant, but this insignificance could be explained by the norm lifecycle model. Furthermore, results support the hypothesis that democratization significantly increases the likelihood that a NAP will be created. Though this offers important insight to WPS practitioners, using democratization initiatives to promote NAP creation risks subverting the goals and priorities of the WPS agenda in favor of broader human rights discourse.

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Introduction

Resolution 1325 —passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2000— promotes the inclusion and representation of women within peace and security institutions around the world. As of October 2019, there are 13 additional UNSC resolutions that make up the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.[1] UN member states implement this agenda by creating National Action Plans (NAPs), of which there are currently 89— only 46% of the total 193 UN member states.[2] Understanding why some countries comply while others do not will provide insight into how the norm of NAP creation is diffusing and in what ways implementation may be inconsistent in the years to come. The WPS agenda is particularly important because it has broader implications than just women's rights; it also focuses on strengthening peace agreements, reducing sexual- and gender-based violence, increasing state stability, and improving the quality of humanitarian disaster relief. This paper aims to quantitatively answer how gender inequality affects the creation of UNSCR 1325 NAPs, hypothesizing that countries with higher rates of gender inequality are less likely to have a NAP.

Literature Review

This literature review will provide an overview of the concepts surrounding international norm diffusion and compliance, which in this case is indicated by creation of UNSCR 1325 NAPs. The first section will briefly discuss the role and debate surrounding NAPs as a medium for norm diffusion. The next section will outline the advantages of using the constructivist model

[1] "UN Documents for Women, Peace and Security: Security Council Resolutions." Security Council Report, 2021. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=Women%2C+Peace+and+Security&cbtype=women-peace-and-security.
[2] "National-Level Implementation." PeaceWomen. WILPF, September 14, 2020. https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states#:~:text=As%20of%20August%202020%2C%20WILPF,an%20allocated%20budget%20for%20implementation.

of norm lifecycles to study norm diffusion, followed by an analysis of empirical trends in state compliance with gender rights norms, including recent data on UNSCR 1325 compliance. Finally, the literature review will conclude by identifying gaps in the existing literature and how the present research will advance scholarly knowledge on the diffusion of the WPS agenda.

Most empirical findings cited in this review were derived from qualitative studies that considered domestic factors that may be important for norm diffusion, though few studied UNSCR 1325. This study assumes that anti-human trafficking norms, women's suffrage, gender quotas, and gender mainstreaming are separate issues, which limits the possibilities of comparison. However, gender rights norms and agreements may be underpinned by similar values, allowing for a comparison of variables that predict norm compliance.[3] Furthermore, drawing from lateral literature presents an opportunity to apply credible methods and findings on norm tipping points to the case of UNSCR 1325. Very little research has been conducted on which factors have led to the adoption or non-adoption of NAPs, so using findings from related fields can advance knowledge about this topic.

The Content and Role of NAPs

NAPs are the international standard for the diffusion of the women, peace, and security agenda among states.[4] Generally, NAPs reference the four pillars of Resolution 1325: participation, protection, prevention, and resolution and recovery.[5] The first pillar, participation, promotes the inclusion of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The second pillar, protection, emphasizes the gendered experience of war and the need for states to protect women

[3] True, Jacqui. *"*Explaining the Global Diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda*." International Political Science Review* 37, no. 3 (2016): 314.
[4] Kirby, Paul and Laura J. Shepherd. *"*Women, Peace, and Security: Mapping the (Re)Production of a Policy Ecosystem." *Journal of Global Security Studies* (2020): 2-3.
[5] "National-Level Implementation." PeaceWomen. WILPF, September 14, 2020.

from sexual and gender-based violence during conflict and instability. The third pillar, prevention, encourages states to take legal action to reduce the likelihood of gender-based violence, while the fourth pillar, resolution and recovery, promotes the inclusion of women and gendered perspectives in post-conflict reconstruction.

States are not the sole authors of NAPs. Governments usually consult civil society organizations on local issues and perspectives while creating NAPs.[6] Therefore, NAPs also include themes and topics that are relevant to local experiences and national goals; some of these topics include the Responsibility to Protect, natural disasters, refugees, and education.[7] While some scholars criticize such NAPs for not strictly following the Resolution 1325 framework, other scholars view "localization" as an innovative way to adapt international agreements to a country's history, culture, and objectives.[8] Nevertheless, scholars have noted that developing countries usually format their NAPs according to Western NAPs, which are in turn criticized for being too narrow and outward oriented. Western NAPs tend to over-emphasize the pillar of protection, focusing on the protection of women in other countries and avoiding internal reforms.[9]

More broadly, NAPs are limited when it comes to accountability and implementation. There is no international enforcement or monitoring mechanism for ensuring the passage and implementation of NAPs at the national level. There is a general lack of disaggregated data regarding women's participation and experience in conflict and political decision-making, and it

[6] Hamilton, Caitlin, Nyibeny Naam, and Laura J. Shepherd. Twenty Years of Women, Peace and Security National Action Plans: Analysis and Lessons Learned: University of Sydney, 2020, 70.
[7] Drumond, Paula and Tamya Rebelo. "Global Pathways Or Local Spins? National Action Plans in South America." Null 22, no. 4 (2020): 477.
[8] Drumond and Rebelo, "Global Pathways," 468; Larsen, Zan. "Benefits of a National Action Plan (NAP) to Implement UNSCR 1325 for the U.S." *Women's Policy Journal of Harvard* 9 (2012): 40.
[9] Drumond and Rebelo, "Global Pathways," 470.

is difficult to change cultural bias and practices through national policies.[10] Some scholars posit that that states enact NAPs to justify intervention in other countries or to advance the success of some other ongoing mission.[11] In this case, NAPs are more rhetorical than meaningful. Even when countries create NAPs that align closely with Resolution 1325, implementation is extremely difficult; for example, there is a significant difference between increasing the quantity of participating women in an institution versus the quality of their participation. Sometimes, governments do not have the resources or expertise to enact the policies they include in their NAP.[12]

Finally, even though the international community promotes NAPs for advancing the WPS agenda, there are policy options outside of NAPs that also advance the norm. Other policies and initiatives, such as national paid maternity leave or political representation quotas, can be implemented without a NAP.[13] Yet, many scholars have hypothesized that countries that are likely to create such policies are also likely to create a NAP, so NAPs and non-NAP policies may be interrelated. Non-NAP WPS policies should decrease domestic gender inequality, creating preconditions for domestic political support of a NAP. While non-NAP policies are not accounted for in this study, it is expected that low levels of gender inequality are at least partially the result of such policies, increasing the likelihood of state compliance with Resolution 1325. Nevertheless, NAPs are the standard measurement of compliance with the international agreement, which is the focus of this study.

[10] Cabrera-Balleza, Mavic. "It is Time to Walk the Talk and Fulfill the Promise of UNSCR 1325." Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 17, no. 3 (2011): 17.
[11] Kirby and Shepherd, "Women, Peace," 6.
[12] Bjørvik, Oda Marie Sverdstad. "The Role and Effectiveness of National Action Plans as Soft Law Tools to Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security." PhdD Diss., (University of Oslo, 2017): 39.
[13] Larsen, "Benefits of a National," 40.

Creating Compliance: Constructivist Models of Norm Diffusion

Researchers studying norm diffusion commonly use constructivist paradigms. While realist and liberal approaches have contributed valuable insight to this field, both schools emphasize a certain level of deliberate state rationality that does not adequately account for the influence of non-state actors in the formation of norms. Non-state actors are important to consider in this regard because of the impact that activist networks can have on domestic political agendas. Constructivist models account for both domestic and international factors in their explanations of norm diffusion. This approach also accounts for cultural variation, which is attractive to scholars studying norm compliance, since domestic values help shape the operational environment for international norms.

There are three prevalent constructivist models for considering norm diffusion. The universal model views international norms as exogenous to local experience yet universally applicable to all states.[14] Dominant states and organizations create the norm internationally then coerce, persuade, and socialize other countries to adopt it.[15] Alternatively, the boomerang model emphasizes the influence of transnational activist networks in shaping global norms for local implementation.[16] A norm may diffuse to a society through activist networks, even if the state initially ignores its implementation on a national level. States are more likely to implement an international norm if there is already a domestic equivalent, or a "cultural match."[17] For example, norms rooted in democratic values are more likely to be implemented in countries where

[14] Krook, Mona Lena and Jacqui True. "Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality." *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 1 (2012): 106-107.
[15] Goodman, Ryan and Derek Jinks. "How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law." *Duke Law Journal* 54, no. 3 (2004): 621-703.
[16] Krook and True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles," 107.
[17] Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis. "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda." *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000): 66.

democracy is already practiced.[18] Like the first model, this model emphasizes only one active party in norm diffusion.

The norm life cycle model addresses the shortfalls of these models by providing a framework for comparing the influence of multiple actors during norm creation and diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink posit that norm life cycles occur in three phases.[19] First, norms are introduced to the international community. Then, they are adopted at the national level by states, international organizations, and activist networks. Finally, norms are internalized by domestic laws, policies, and professionals.[20] Several parties underpin each stage of this process, including international actors from the universal model as well as activist networks from the boomerang model.[21] Such flexibility reflects the complex environment from which norms emerge, and it accounts for the many mechanisms and actors that interact during norm creation.

The second stage of the norm life cycle is the most important for analyzing why certain states adopt a norm while others do not. This stage is known as the "norm cascade," which leads to a "tipping point" of widespread norm adoption beyond the initial core group of states.[22] There are many types of interactions that lead to norm adoption. Some states adopt the norm once they are socialized by the behavior of other states. Socialization, or acculturation, is "the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture."[23] Some researchers have also put forth that norm adoption occurs when states are shamed or

[18] True, "Explaining the Global," 313.
[19] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.
[20] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm," 898.
[21] Krook and True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles," 105.
[22] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm," 898.
[23] Goodman and Jinks, "How to Influence," 626.

shunned by influential actors.[24] Pressure to assimilate can also manifest at multilateral, bilateral, and domestic levels as state and non-state actors threaten a state's reputation through public judgment.[25] Often, the tipping point is reached when many of these mechanisms converge.

Other scholars have criticized the norm life cycle approach for being more descriptive than predictive since it depends on context rather than timeless theory.[26] The norm life cycle model is also reliant on sociological principles, and those principles may not always explain state behavior; UNSCR 1325 reportedly reached its tipping point in 2010, yet less than half UN member states have internalized the norm.[27] Krook and True view the norm life cycle model as too linear, treating norms and state preferences as separate and fixed.[28] Similarly, Kirby and Shephard emphasize that the WPS norm changes every time a country or international actor publishes a related document with different terminology.[29] Even so, this literature accepts the norm life cycle model as an intellectual framework for analyzing the conditions that characterize the so-called tipping point. It provides structure for examining a specific point in time rather than the substantive evolution of the norm, which is appropriate for the scope of this paper.

From Theory to Practice: Empirical Predictors of Norm Compliance

Many scholars studying gender equality norms have attempted to determine the factors that predict country norm adoption. These factors can be broadly categorized into international group dynamics and domestic drivers, which are not always entirely distinct. For example,

[24]Goodman and Jinks, "How to Influence," 640-641; Krook and True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles"; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm," 895-896.
[25] Tryggestad, Torunn L. "International Norms and Political Change: "Women, Peace and Security" and the UN Security Agenda." University of Oslo, 2014: 59; Zwingel, Susanne. "How do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women's Rights in Transnational Perspectives." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2012): 124;
[26] Keohane, Robert O. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (1988): 379-396.
[27] Tryggestad, "International Norms," 59; Kirby and Shepherd, "Women, Peace."
[28] Krook and True, "Rethinking the Life Cycles," 108-109.
[29] Kirby and Shepherd, "Women, Peace," 2-3.

activist networks are often domestic since they operate within states, but they can also be transnational through their connection to the UN. Understanding the mechanisms of norm diffusion is important because it "helps us to ascertain the prospects for the further diffusion of WPS frameworks in national and regional governance."[30] It can also support the efforts of relevant WPS leaders, academics, and donor governments interested in promoting further NAP creation by revealing shortfalls and obstacles in NAP creation so far.

International Group Dynamics

International groups can influence state behavior in several ways. First, Kelley argues that groups and states use scorecard diplomacy by taking advantage of public judgment to damage the reputation of states and pressure them to change their behavior. One example is the US State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report, which gives grades to states based on their efforts to stop human trafficking.[31] NATO also created a scorecard to grade its members on their implementation of UNSCR 1325.[32] However, the effects of this scorecard are unclear since most NATO members already had a NAP when the scorecard was released. Additionally, unlike the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, the NATO scorecard has been published only once, suggesting a lower level of pressure from the organization on its members. This could further indicate the importance of institutional commitment to a norm before members can be pressured to change.

A second mechanism that affects state behavior is acculturation, demonstrated by the influence of developed countries on the formation of NAPs in developing countries. NAPs in

[30] True, "Explaining the Global," 319.
[31] Kelley, Judith Green. *Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence their Reputation and Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017: 44-61.
[32] "The 1325 Scorecard." Women in International Security, 2015. https://www.wiisglobal.org/programs/unscr-1325-nato/.

developing countries are mainly funded by Official Development Assistance from Western countries.[33] Therefore, relationships with developed countries increase the likelihood that developing countries will create NAPs. True found that states are more likely to implement NAPs when they belong to a multilateral group that has a regional action plan, such as NATO or the African Union.[34] An inverse example is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which does not have a regional action plan and includes only two member states with a NAP, the Philippines and Indonesia.[35] Davies, Nackers, and Teitt found that the cultural and organizational norms of ASEAN most likely reduced national motivations to create NAPs. Acculturation may change the ASEAN orientation toward WPS as Western actors like the UN, Australia, the US, and Canada continue to influence ASEAN to create a regional action plan of its own.[36] Countries tend to adopt norms that increase their legitimacy within the groups to which they belong, and outside influence can change a group's values and priorities.

Finally, countries implement gender equality norms to gain membership in exclusive groups that value those norms.[37] During its campaign for a seat on the UNSC, Australia promoted itself as a WPS leader and global example for implementing UNSCR 1325.[38] However, membership on the UNSC is not predictive of NAP adoption, which suggests that

[33] Bjørvik, Oda Marie Sverdstad. "The Role and Effectiveness of National Action Plans as Soft Law Tools to Implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security." PhdD Diss., (University of Oslo, 2017).
[34] True, "Explaining the Global."
[35] Davies, Sara E., Kimberly Nackers, and Sarah Teitt. "Women, Peace and Security as an ASEAN Priority." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 3 (2014): 334.
[36] Vietnam News Agency. "ASEAN Study Sheds New Light on Women, Peace and Security Stature in Southeast Asia." *Vietnam News Agency,* March 9, 2021, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/asean-study-sheds-new-light-on-women-peace-and-security-stature-in-southeast-asia/197295.vnp.
[37] Avdeyeva, O. "Does Reputation Matter for States' Compliance with International Treaties? States Enforcement of Anti-Trafficking Norms." *The International Journal of Human Rights* 16, no. 2 (2012): 298-320.
[38] Shepherd, Laura J. and Jacqui True. "The Women, Peace and Security Agenda and Australian Leadership in the World: From Rhetoric to Commitment?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 3 (2014): 257-284.

group membership alone does not result in compliance.[39] Since UNSCR 1325 is non-binding, countries must view a direct connection between the norm and group membership for this theory to hold. International group dynamics are difficult to measure, so it is likely that these factors are most helpful for case studies rather than an analysis of norm adoption trends.

Domestic Drivers

From empirical research on gender rights norms emerges four main factors that facilitate compliance with gender equality norms: national policy interests, political representation, civil society activism, and domestic norms.

1. National Policy Interests

States use national policy interests to justify the initial adoption of the norm and to justify their level of commitment to compliance. Policy interests emerge from high-context processes that are specific to each country. Shepherd and True found that the Australian government implemented its NAP to gain more influence in the UNSC, a bipartisan foreign policy objective.[40] In a similar case study, Motoyama found that the Japanese government passed its NAP in an attempt to overwrite its imperial history of violence and abuse against women during WWII.[41] Japanese officials emphasized the policy in hopes of offsetting domestic backlash against a greater role of the military in its foreign policy. Countries also adjust their NAPs to appear compliant and maintain a positive international reputation yet still preserve their sense of sovereignty. For example, most ASEAN countries have not fully implemented UNSCR 1325 because of concerns that a NAP invites foreign scrutiny and interference in domestic affairs.[42]

[39] True, "Explaining the Global."
[40] Shepherd and True, "The Women," 257-258.
[41] Motoyama, Hisako. "Formulating Japan's UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and Forgetting the "Comfort Women"." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 20, no. 1 (2018): 39-53.
[42] Davies, Nackers, and Teitt, "Women, Peace," 333-355.

While policy interests do affect whether a government adopts a norm, there are likely antecedent variables that create a "culture match" between existing national policies and emerging international norms. Therefore, national policy interests may be most useful for specific case studies rather than a global analysis.

2. Political Representation of Women

There is no consensus about the influence of female political representation on compliance with gender equality norms. Several studies have found a relationship between the number of women in government service and the creation of policies regarding gender rights norms.[43] Some researchers argue that women in political structures are important only in combination with other factors, such as an organized civil society organization or a prevalence of female technocrats within the bureaucracy.[44] However, others concluded that the number of female legislators is insignificant in comparison to other factors like government effectiveness and world culture ties.[45] This disagreement could stem from differing datasets, the other variables used in the multivariate analyses, or the various definitions of female political representation. As there is no consensus, the topic requires further research. Since one of the main components of UNSCR 1325 is gender mainstreaming within political institutions, female political representation could plausibly affect a government's willingness to comply.

[43] Larsen, "Benefits of a National," 32-41; Schonhofer, "Political Determinants"; Avdeyeva, "Does Reputation"; True, "Explaining the Global."
[44]Guerrina, Roberta, Laura Chappell, and Katharine A. M. Wright. "Transforming CSDP? Feminist Triangles and Gender Regimes." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56, no. 5 (2018).
[45] Amahazion, Fikre. "Human Trafficking: The Need for Human Rights and Government Effectiveness in Enforcing Anti-Trafficking." *Global Crime* 16, no. 3 (2015)

3. Domestic and Transnational Activism

Many researchers agree that civil society organizations and activist networks are important for implementing norms, although there are disagreements regarding the direction of their effect. Activist networks are purported to create domestic narratives that welcome international norms.[46] However, transnational advocacy networks can also undermine the implementation of norms, such that "states with *fewer* [emphasis added] domestic connections to transnational activist women's organizing are more likely to adopt [the norm]," according to Hughes, Krook, and Paxton.[47] Competing priorities and voices can undermine the solidarity of a movement. In some cases, a government may believe that minority activist groups threaten the existing political balance and therefore may be unwilling to implement the demanded change.[48] Therefore, the role of activist networks in norm diffusion appears to be highly nuanced. If activist networks affect norm compliance at all, the relationship could be positive or negative depending on country context.

4. Domestic Norms

Domestic norms are often examined in relation to norm compliance, but much of the research has not explained which domestic norms are important, or under which circumstances they influence diffusion. One study found that women's suffrage competed with patriarchal norms for almost 80 years before the norm reached an international tipping point.[49] Some authors have hypothesized that a country's commitment to gender equality and its cultural views toward

[46] Zwingel, "How do Norms," 121.
[47] Hughes, Melanie M., Mona Lena Krook, and Pamela Paxton. "Transnational Women's Activism and the Global Diffusion of Gender Quotas." *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 2 (2015): 358.
[48] Hughes et al, "Transnational Women's," 358-359.
[49] Finnemore and Sikkin, "International Norm," 894-896

women could affect the probability that countries will pass NAPs.[50] The WPS agenda may face specific resistance that cannot be compared to other gender equality initiatives, since male bias is entrenched in security and defense professions.[51] Furthermore, gender equality may be a function of broader norms, such as democracy or commitment to human rights.[52]

Notably, True quantitatively analyzed how conflict, democracy, and women in political power affected the diffusion of UNSCR 1325 NAPs.[53] She found that democratic countries are more likely to implement a NAP than their less-democratic counterparts.[54] The number of women in a country's parliament is also a significant factor in predicting the likelihood that a NAP will be created, whereas a country's conflict status and membership in the UNSC does not significantly affect the probability of NAP adoption. This research could be strengthened by replication that considers other variables that have been found to be influential in the diffusion of norms, such as the presence of transnational activist networks. Furthermore, the use of bivariate and multivariate regressions could strengthen the validity of True's findings. Of course, such tests cannot account for high-context variables like national policy interests, but they can provide an overview of the norm landscape and provide reference for future case studies regarding UNSCR 1325.

Framework and Gaps for the Present Research

The norm life cycle model provides a framework for studying differences in domestic factors that influenced countries to create a NAP. This model also accounts for the domestic,

[50] True, "Explaining the Global," 314; Larsen, "Benefits of a National," 36; Davies, Nackers, and Teitt, "Women, Peace."
[51] Larsen, "Benefits of a National," 35.
[52] True, "Explaining the Global," 316.
[53] True, "Explaining the Global."
[54] True, "Explaining the Global," 318.

transnational, and international influences and actors that are considered in the boomerang and universal models. The present study will address gaps in previous literature by applying quantitative analyses to variables that have not yet been studied in relation to UNSCR 1325 implementation, including gender inequality scores and international embeddedness. Applying these results to the approximate stages of the norm life cycle model could provide deeper insight into which countries are the norm leaders and why some countries have not yet created a NAP. This study hypothesizes that gender inequality scores will be lower among countries that passed their NAPs during or after the tipping point in 2010, in contrast with higher scores in countries that passed an NAP after 2010, and in countries that still do not have one in effect. Findings from this investigation will contribute to knowledge of compliance with UNSCR 1325, as well as strengthen empirical evidence regarding state compliance with international agreements.

Testing the Effect of Gender Inequality on NAP Creation

Hypotheses

This study hypothesizes that the level of gender inequality in a country has a significant negative impact on the likelihood of that country to create a NAP. This has not been tested before, although it is informed by previous literature. Guiding this hypothesis is the concept of "cultural match," the idea that states are more likely to implement international norms that already align with domestic norms.[55] Since UNSCR 1325 is focused on promoting gender equality within peace and security institutions, widespread equality in society at large could create an environment that facilitates those objectives. In her study, True tested whether previous ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

[55] Cortell and Davis, "Understanding the Domestic," 73.

Women (CEDAW) affected the probability that states would create a NAP.[56] She found no significant overlap between countries that ratified CEDAW and countries that created a NAP. In her discussion, she posited that ratification of a separate agreement might not affect the probability of creating a NAP, but underlying commitments to gender equality could. This paper aims to test this hypothesis.

> *H_0: In a comparison of countries, there is no relationship between gender inequality levels and NAP creation.*
>
> *H_1: In a comparison of countries, gender inequality levels negatively affect NAP creation, such that countries with high levels of gender inequality are less likely to create a NAP.*

Testing the relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation could reveal important findings about the potential impact of UNSCR 1325. If gender inequality is high in countries without a NAP, then other norms may need to diffuse to those countries first, causing the WPS agenda to not be consistently implemented across every country. If there is no difference in gender inequality between NAP adopters and non-adopters, then the culture match argument may be outweighed by other factors in the diffusion of UNSCR 1325. Regardless of the outcome, it will inform current NAP countries, WPS activists, and regional groups with action plans about the commonalities among countries that do not have NAPs. Outliers or unexpected results could also provide reference for future case studies on why a certain country did or did not create a NAP. Understanding why countries are reluctant or unable to pass NAPs

[56] True, "Explaining the Global," 314.

could inform future efforts to diffuse the WPS norm, which would have far-reaching implications for future peace negotiations, UN peacekeeping efforts, and conflict interventions.

In recognition that gender inequality is likely not the only factor that affects the probability of NAP creation, two control variables will also be tested. First, the level of democratization of a given country could affect its intention to implement an international norm regarding gender representation in highly political and traditionally male roles. True found a significant difference in democratization between NAP adopters and non-adopters, such that adopters exhibited higher levels of democratization than non-adopters.[57] She argued that democracies are more likely to implement NAPs than non-democracies because of the transparency, openness, and public political participation that characterizes democratic societies. In her analysis, she emphasized the role of civil society groups in promoting NAPs since such groups have more operational freedom in democracies than non-democracies.

It is also important to consider the relationship between gender inequality and democracy and why it is difficult to consider one without the other. Previous literature contends that democracy and gender inequality are self-reinforcing and that both are necessary but not sufficient for the other. For example, Cho found that higher levels of democracy can facilitate social equality, but does not guarantee an improvement in women's political or economic rights on its own.[58] Beer found that women's equality is likely to increase when a country practices democracy and women's suffrage for decades, which suggests that there is a potential difference in gender inequality between newer democracies and older democracies.[59] Likewise, increased

[57] True, "Explaining the Global," 318.
[58] Cho, Seo-Young. "International Women's Convention, Democracy, and Gender Equality." *Social Science Quarterly* 95, no. 3 (September 2014): 719–39.
[59] Beer, C. "Democracy and Gender Equality." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (2009): 212-227.

political representation of women can strengthen a democracy by building inclusive perspectives and increasing domestic stability.[60] Therefore, this study expects that both gender equality levels and democracy levels play a positive role in NAP creation. Democratic countries, then, are more likely to have a NAP than autocratic countries, and countries with stronger democracies are more likely to have a NAP than countries with weaker democracies.

> *H_2: In a comparison of countries, democratization positively affects NAP creation, such that countries with higher levels of democracy are more likely to create NAPs than countries with lower levels of democracy.*

Finally, the extent to which a country is embedded in world culture is another variable that may significantly influence gender equality and NAP creation. Several researchers have noted that socialization and acculturation can play a significant role in the diffusion of international norms.[61] International networks and relations with the international community can increase a country's exposure to ideas, information, norms, and patterns of behavior, therefore increasing its likelihood of adopting international culture. Furthermore, ties to developed countries may increase the likelihood of developing countries to create NAPs since many NAPs in developing countries were funded by Official Development Assistance.[62] This could diminish the role of democracy in influencing the likelihood of NAP creation since donor countries provide aid and support to many developing countries that are weak or pseudo-democracies. Pressure from wealthier, more powerful countries, and perhaps even international non-

[60] Piccone, Ted. "Democracy, gender equality, and security." *Brookings Institution Policy Brief, September* (2017).
[61] Amahazion, "Human Trafficking"; Goodman and Jinks, "How to Influence"; Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm"; Chayes and Chayes, "On Compliance"; Cortell and Davis, "Understanding the Domestic."
[62] Bjørvik, "The Role."

governmental organizations (NGOs), may be quite influential in overriding the national agendas of weaker countries.

> *H_3: In a comparison of countries, embeddedness in world culture positively affects NAP creation, such that countries with more ties to the international community are more likely to create NAPs than countries that have fewer ties to the international community.*



These variables are not exhaustive, and there may be additional variables that impact the likelihood of the creation of NAPs. For example, a country's wealth or access to resources or level of commitment to other relevant norms, such as sovereignty, might affect a country's willingness to implement an unenforceable agreement. The present combination of factors may also inadvertently measure other variables, such as geographic proximity to the West or level of development. It could also be that many countries that have not passed a NAP have simply not *yet* passed a NAP and may one day do so. Nevertheless, the question still stands why some countries appear more reluctant than others to create a NAP, with less than half of all UNSC members with NAPs over 20 years after the passage of UNSC 1325. Though the present study does not account for many variables that also deserve merit in this conversation, it offers a viable range of social and political explanations for country compliance with UNSCR 1325.

Data and Methods

Dependent variable

Compliance with UNSCR 1325 will be measured by whether a UN Member State has a NAP in 2020, as this has been the standard for measuring compliance in previous studies. This data is available through non-governmental organizations that monitor the passage and quality of countries' NAPs.[63] Notably, this data offers an overview of the trends in NAP creation across all UN member states. It is coded as a dummy variable, with 0 signifying no NAP and 1 signifying a NAP in 2020. At the end of 2020, 89 UN member states had NAPs while 104 did not. As illustrated by Figure 1, nearly all countries in Europe have passed a NAP while most countries in Asia have not. Even some countries that have experienced humanitarian crises and conflict in recent years have passed NAPs, including Yemen, Myanmar, and Sudan. Furthermore, despite the overall lack of NAPs in Asia, there are NAPs in nearly every region of the world, not just in the West.

Figure 1: Countries with NAPs in 2020



Data retrieved from https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states.

[63] "National-Level Implementation." PeaceWomen. WILPF, February 18, 2021. https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states.

Figure 2 supports the claim by other authors that 2010 was the tipping point for UNSCR 1325 as 11 countries passed a NAP that year, a number that was reached again in 2017. NAPs have been passed every year since 2005. Denmark was the first country to pass a NAP in 2005, followed by many countries in northern and western Europe in 2006 and 2007. In 2008, the Ivory Coast and Uganda were the first African countries to pass a NAP, while Chile broke the South American barrier in 2009. In the landmark year of 2010, the Philippines became the first Asian country to create a NAP, while the US did not pass its NAP until 2011. The most recent countries to create NAPs were Sudan, South Africa, Slovakia, Malta, and Latvia in 2020.

Figure 2: Number of NAPs Passed per Year



Data retrieved from https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states.

Independent variables

There are three independent variables in this study. First, the UN Gender Inequality Index (GII) will operationalize gender inequality. The GII, calculated as part of the annual Human Development Index (HDI), measures the disparities between men and women in three categories: reproductive health, political empowerment, and labor market participation.[64] The first category is a measure of the maternal mortality ratio and the adolescent birth rate, two aspects of health

[64] United Nations Development Programme. "Human Development Reports: Gender Inequality Index (GII)." Accessed 1/31/21, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii.

specific to women. Empowerment is measured in terms of education and political representation. Education is operationalized by comparing the number of men and women with a secondary education or higher, while political representation is measured by the number of men and women with seats in parliament. Finally, labor market participation compares the participation rates of men and women to approximate a measure of economic enablement.

GII data is available for every five years from 1995 to 2010 and for every year from 2010 to 2019.[65] Scores are calculated on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no disparity between men and women and 1 indicating extremely high disparity between men and women. In 2018, gender inequality correlated with development, such that countries with very high human development (HDI scores of .800 and above) averaged 0.175 in gender inequality, while countries with low human development (HDI scores of .550 and below) averaged 0.590 in gender inequality.[66] The world average gender inequality score was 0.439. Developing countries scored an average of 0.466, while country members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development scored an average of 0.182. Scores also vary by region, with Europe and Central Asia scoring 0.276 in 2018 while South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Arab states scored above 0.5. East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean scored in the middle around 0.3.

There are drawbacks to using an aggregated dataset. The GII incorporates a wide range of variables, which can obfuscate what is really being measured. One example is the dimension of reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratios and adolescent birth ratios. It is possible that maternal mortality ratios are dependent on national or individual wealth rather than

[65] United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development."
[66] United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Reports: HDR Technical Notes." Accessed 3/22/21, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/hdr-technical-notes.

systemic discrimination against women; greater wealth at the national level could provide better healthcare infrastructure and personal wealth would provide the ability to afford it. To a certain extent, this might be true. However, gender inequality is not captured by a single dimension, and reproductive health statistics may capture the relative importance of childbearing— a role specific to women—in each society. For example, the maternal mortality ratio in the US in 2020 was 19 deaths per 100,000 live births.[67] The average maternal mortality ratio in all highly developed countries was 14; to compare, Sweden's ratio was 4 and the United Kingdom's ratio was 7 deaths per 100,000 live births. This difference may seem negligible, but it could affect how a country prioritizes women's health needs in refugee camps or post-conflict zones. UNSCR 1325 emphasizes including women's perspectives and needs in all dimensions, not just economic and political ones, and especially in situations when women are vulnerable to sexual abuse, rape, and gender-specific causes of death. Moreover, both governments and NGOs affect reproductive health statistics through funding and health programs. These statistics, then, might provide a perspective on gender inequality that draws from a segment of society that is broader than just the government.

The GII is also limited in that it cannot account for additional factors that likely contribute to gender inequality. Moreover, the data is collected, and the index is calculated by the UN, which introduces the possibility of institutional bias into the operationalization of gender inequality. As a result of these limitations, this dataset may measure Westernization more accurately than it does gender inequality. Even so, no dataset is complete and there will always be alternate ways to measure gender inequality. This index offers a broad overview of several valid variables across social, political, and economic realms, and it builds on True's finding that

[67] United Nations Development Programme. "Human Development Reports."

the proportion of women in parliament impacts NAP compliance.[68] The shortfalls noted above do not significantly reduce the validity and reliability of the dataset, but they should be considered when interpreting results of the analysis.

The second independent variable is democratization, which will be operationalized by the Polity 5 Annual Timeseries, a dataset produced by the Center for Systemic Peace that categorizes regime characteristics on a spectrum from authoritarian to democratic.[69] Countries are evaluated according to the way in which executive leaders come into office, government constraints on executive authority, and the freedom of political competition. Based on these factors, countries are assigned a score on both a democratic index and an authoritarian index. Notably, True used only the democratic index in her analysis of NAP compliance. This study will use the total spectrum index in which countries are ranked on a scale from -10 to +10, with -10 signifying a hereditary monarchy and +10 signifying a consolidated democracy. The authors of the dataset note that this dataset is useful for aggregate investigative research but does not substitute in-depth, qualitative research. Using the full spectrum of regime types to analyze NAP implementation will expand our understanding of how well both democratic and non-democratic governments have complied with UNSCR 1325.

The final independent variable for consideration is international embeddedness. Previous researchers have operationalized this variable by using the *Yearbook of International Organizations* to identify how many international NGOs are registered in each country.[70] This has been accepted as an indicator of international embeddedness because of the transnational

[68] True, "Explaining the Global," 318.
[69] Center for Systemic Peace. "The Polity Project." Accessed 1/31/21, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.
[70] Amahazion, "Human Trafficking," 175.

activist ties that exist between countries as a result of international organizations. However, this operationalization may be measuring democracy instead of international ties because the operation of international non-government organizations relies on domestic freedoms that may not be afforded by non-democratic governments. Furthermore, not all democracies are similar, and many may be too weak to enforce the rule of law that protects the operations of international organizations.

Another option for operationalizing international embeddedness is measuring the level of political globalization within each country. Globalization is the process of increasing the interconnectedness of goods, information, and people between countries. The KOF Globalization Index compiles data on the economic, social, and political aspects of globalization and assigns globalization scores to countries on a scale from 1 to 100, with 100 indicating a highly globalized country.[71] One of the variables in this index, *de facto* political globalization, measures the number of international NGOs operating within a country, the number of current UN peacekeepers from that country, and the number of embassies in the country.[72] This accounts for the conventional method of measuring transnational activism, while also measuring the connections of countries to international interests.

Methods

The sample for this study will be all UN member states for which data is available. 2018 is the last year with available data for every variable, making the sample size 131 countries. 62 countries from that sample, 47%, have NAPs, so this proportion of compliance is similar to the proportion of compliance in the total population in 2020. However, the proportion of compliance

[71] Gygli, Savina, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke and Jan-Egbert Sturm (2019): The KOF Globalisation Index – Revisited, *Review of International Organizations, 14(3), 543-574.*
[72] Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke and Sturm, "The KOF."

represented by the data for 2018 is slightly higher than the actual proportion of compliance in 2018 because most of the missing data is for non-NAP countries. The over-representation of NAP countries could skew the results. Examining data from a single year also does not account for change over time, which means any relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation found in this study is specific to this data and timeframe.[73]

To establish significance in the relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation, chi-squared tests will be conducted as a first step. This test will determine if there is a significant difference between the average level of gender inequality in countries that have NAPs versus countries that do not. The second chi-squared test will determine whether there is a difference in the level of gender inequality depending on the year when a country passed its NAP. It is expected that countries that passed their NAPs after the tipping point will have higher levels of gender inequality than countries that were among the first to create NAPs. Finally, a logistic regression analysis will determine how significantly gender inequality affects the probability that a country passes a NAP, if at all. This test will also account for the confounding variables described earlier in this section.

Data Analysis

To determine a baseline difference in countries with NAPs versus countries without NAPs, a chi-squared test shows the breakdown of gender inequality levels by NAP creation. The NAP was coded as a dummy variable, with "0" or "No" indicating that the country did not have a NAP and "1" or "Yes" indicating that a country did have a NAP. The GII was transformed into five groups to categorize the data according to "very low," "low," "medium," "high," and "very

[73] The countries that passed NAPs from 2019 to 2020 were Armenia, Bangladesh, Latvia, Lebanon, Namibia, South Africa, Yemen, Malta, Slovakia and Sudan.

high" gender inequality levels.[74] The chi-squared value of 22.71 indicates that there is a difference between the expected and observed values of the data, while the p-value of 0.000 indicates that this relationship is significant and unlikely to be due to chance.

Countries with very low gender inequality levels had the highest proportion of compliance at 84%, while countries with medium levels of gender inequality had the lowest rate of compliance at about 23%. Notably, countries with low gender equality had similar proportions of compliance to countries with very high levels of gender equality. In fact, there was a higher rate of compliance among countries with very high levels of gender inequality than among countries with medium or high gender inequality. In sum, only countries with very low or very high levels of gender inequality were more likely to have a NAP than to not have a NAP.

Table 1: Chi-Squared Test Between NAP Status and Gender Inequality Level (Column Percentages)

	GII Level					
NAP	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High	**Total**
No	16.00	**51.85**	**76.92**	**69.23**	48.15	52.67
Yes	**84.00**	48.15	23.08	30.77	**51.85**	47.33
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(4) = 22.7095 | Pr = 0.000

To further investigate this relationship, the connection between gender inequality levels and the year of NAP passage was examined. A scatterplot between the 2018 GII scores of NAP adopters and the years when countries passed their NAPs shows a very weak correlation between the two variables. From 2005 to 2007, countries that passed a NAP had GII levels of less than .2,

[74] The available data was grouped so that each category would have a roughly similar number of data points. The data is grouped as follows: "very low" includes countries that score between .039 and .125; "low" is between .126 and .274; "medium" is between .279 and .413; "high" is between .416 and .521; and "very high" is between .527 and .726.

meaning that they had low levels of gender inequality. This indicates a weak, positive, linear relationship, but after 2007 this relationship no longer holds. In 2008, both countries with GII levels over .5 and countries will GII levels under .1 passed NAPs. However, it does appear that the minimum GII score increased by a marginal amount over time, which could support the hypothesis that countries with higher gender inequality levels will pass NAPs later than countries with lower gender inequality levels. It also appears that countries of similar gender inequality levels passed NAPs around the same time, with clusters appearing in 2010, 2012, 2017, and 2018.

Figure 3: 2018 GII Score by Year of NAP Creation



A chi-squared test revealed that there is a significant difference in the years when countries of different GII levels passed their NAPs (Table 2). For this test, the NAP passage years were sorted into four groups from 2005 to 2009; 2010 to 2011; 2012 to 2015; and 2016 to 2018. These groups were created to have similar numbers of countries; since 2010 was the tipping point for NAP creation, 2010 to 2011 had roughly the same number of new NAPs as

every other grouping. GII groups again sorted as “very low,” “low,” “medium,” “high,” and “very high.” The chi-squared value of 27.2432 indicated that there was a difference between the expected and observed values, and the p-value of 0.007 indicated that this relationship is unlikely to be due to chance.

Consistent with the scatterplot, over half of the countries that passed NAPs with a very low level of gender inequality passed them between 2005 and 2009. Countries with low gender inequality mostly passed NAPs during the 2016 to 2018 period, but did have the highest group proportion of 2010 to 2011. Medium inequality countries were most likely to pass their NAPs during 2012 to 2015, while high and very high inequality countries were most likely to pass their NAPs after 2012. These results only partially support the hypothesis because medium, high, and very high inequality countries were likely to pass NAPs after very low inequality countries, but low inequality countries were most likely to pass NAPs after countries with medium inequality or higher.

Table 2: Chi-Squared Calculation of NAP Passage Year by Gender Inequality Level

	GII Level					
NAP	Very Low	Low	Medium	High	Very High	**Total**
2005-2009	**52.38**	7.69	16.67	0.00	14.29	25.00
2010-2011	28.57	**30.77**	0.00	25.00	14.29	23.53
2012-2015	14.29	7.69	**50.00**	**37.50**	**42.86**	26.47
2016-2018	4.76	**53.85**	33.33	**37.50**	28.57	25.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson chi2(12) = 27.2432 | Pr = 0.007

While chi-squared tests established significance, a logistic regression describes the relationship between the variables. A bivariate logistic regression analysis of the relationship between GII scores and the probability that a country creates a NAP yielded an equation of Log(p/1-p) = .716 – 2.46*GII (Table 3). In other words, a unit increase in the GII score reduces the log odds that a country has a NAP by -2.46; high gender inequality reduces the probability that a country creates a NAP. A z-score of -2.53 indicates that countries with NAPs have a mean GII score that is about 2.5 standard deviations below the mean, and the p-value of 0.011 is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Moreover, the probability of attaining the chi-squared value is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This appears to support the hypothesis that countries with NAPs have lower levels of gender inequality than countries that do not have NAPs.

Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of NAP Creation Status by Gender Inequality Level

NAP	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]
GII Score	-2.463619	.9743599	-2.53	0.011	-4.37333 -.5539089
_cons	.7160013	.3697158	1.94	0.053	-.0086283 1.440631

Number of obs = 131
LR chi2(1) = 6.71
Prob > chi2 = 0.0096
Pseudo R2 = 0.0370

A multivariate logistic regression, however, reveals that the results of the bivariate regression may be misleading. When analyzed alongside globalization and democratization, the GII score does not significantly impact the log odds that a country has developed a NAP (Table 4). The logistic regression yielded an equation of Log(p/1-p) = -2.08992 -.635591*GII +

0.232173*Globalization + .121551*Democracy. Still, both GII scores and globalization scores are insignificant at the 0.05 level, with respective p-values of 0.6 and 0.054. The z score for GII scores was also different at -0.52, which is much closer to the mean than the z score of the bivariate regression. Even so, democracy is a statistically significant independent variable; for every one-unit increase in democracy scores we expect a .121551 increase in the log-odds of the dependent variable NAP, holding all other independent variables constant. Furthermore, countries with NAPs have a democracy score that is over three standard deviations above the mean. This affirms previous findings that levels of democracy affect NAP creation.

Table 4: Logistic Regression Analysis of NAP Creation Status by Gender Inequality Level, Globalization Score, and Democracy Score

NAP	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
GII Score	-.635591	1.21136	-0.52	0.600	-3.009812	1.73863
Globalization	0.232173	.012049	1.93	0.054	-.0003983	.046833
Democracy	.121551	.0391206	3.11	0.002	.0448761	.1982258
_cons	-2.08992	1.124698	-1.86	0.063	-4.294287	.1144466

Number of obs = 130
LR chi2(1) = 25.11
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1395

Discussion of Results and Implications

Based on the results of this study, summarized in Table 5, the effect of gender inequality on UNSCR 1325 compliance appears indirect at most, so we do not reject the null hypothesis. Though there was a significant difference in gender inequality levels in countries with NAPs compared to countries without NAPs, the chi-squared tests and multivariate logistic regression provided evidence against the significance of that difference. The strongest correlation between a country's GII score and a country's NAP status appeared within countries with the very highest

levels of gender inequality and the very lowest levels of gender inequality. Gender inequality levels also did not affect the timing of NAP creation except perhaps in countries with the very lowest levels of gender inequality. This suggests that the actual relationship between gender inequality and NAP compliance could be conditional, such that domestic norms matter for agreement compliance before the norm tipping point, but less so afterwards.

Table 5: Summary of Hypothesis, Methods, and Results

Hypothesis	Method(s) of Analysis	Results
H0: There is no significant relationship between gender inequality and NAP creation. *H1: Gender inequality negatively affects NAP creation.*	Chi-squared tests; bivariate and multivariate logistic regressions	▪ Only countries with very low and very high gender inequality were more likely to have a NAP, contradicting *H1*; ▪ Only countries with very low inequality were more likely to pass their NAPs first, partially consistent with *H1*; ▪ Gender inequality had an insignificant impact on NAP creation when analyzed alongside democracy and embeddedness, contradicting *H1*.
H2: Democratization positively affects NAP creation.	Multivariate logistic regression	▪ Democratization had a slight but significant positive effect on the likelihood of NAP creation, consistent with *H2*.
H3: Embeddedness in world culture positively affects NAP creation.	Multivariate logistic regression	▪ There was no significant effect of embeddedness on the likelihood of NAP creation, contradicting *H3*.

The third hypothesis regarding globalization is also rejected, although the role of globalization should not be discounted in future studies. Because of time restrictions, tests on the relationship between globalization and gender inequality were limited. International embeddedness was insignificant in the multivariate regression, and a disaggregated analysis could reveal if certain aspects of political globalization are more influential than others on NAP

creation. It could also be that the measurements of international embeddedness used in this study—the numbers of international non-governmental organizations, embassies, and deployed peacekeepers of each country—are best studied case by case within the context of domestic policies toward international involvement. These findings could also potentially support observations that transnational networks can have both a positive and negative effect on norm compliance, but, in this case, there is neither a strong positive nor a strong negative relationship between *de facto* political globalization and NAP creation.

Finally, we do not reject the second hypothesis since the multivariate regression demonstrated that democratization had a significant impact on the log odds of a positive outcome in the dependent variable. Democracy could provide a stronger domestic cultural match for international agreements than gender equality norms, although this study did not investigate the relationship between democracy and gender equality. The significance of democracy in this study affirms similar findings from other researchers, and future projects could investigate the aspects of democratic regimes that increase the probability that they adopt a NAP. It is possible that democracies are more likely to comply with UN agreements in general, or perhaps democracies normalize female political leadership and inclusion in a way that non-democracies do not, even if non-democracies have a relatively low level of gender inequality. It is possible that the universal human rights norm, commonly found in democracies, is more influential than domestic gender norms; a country's commitment to broad human rights might be a tide that raises all ships, leading to more favorable political conditions for women. This affirms theories of a "cultural match" between democracies and value-based agreements; perhaps countries that have high levels of inequality yet also have a NAP are relatively new democracies moving toward greater gender equality.

Several factors could negatively impact the validity of these results. While 130 observations constitute a respectable sample size that meets the threshold for the analysis conducted, missing data reduced the ability of the dataset to represent the actual population. Complete datasets for all UN member states would provide more robust results that may vary. There could also be other intervening or confounding variables that were not included in this study. Levels of economic and social development, different measures of transnational interconnectedness, and government budgets are just a few examples of other variables that could plausibly affect UNSCR 1325 implementation. One other potentially confounding factor is the presence of non-NAP policies that contribute to the WPS norm. Perhaps countries with low gender inequality do have WPS-related policies that are not NAPs, which could make a NAP seem redundant and unnecessary. Since these types of policies are not standardized like NAPs, a qualitative case study would be the best way to consider their effect on Resolution 1325 non-compliance.

Disaggregated analysis could also yield different results. The concepts that this study used could be operationalized with a variety of other datasets and definitions. For example, the results of the multivariate analysis may add nuance to True's finding that female political representation positively affects NAP creation because female political representation is included as a measure of the GII. Without a disaggregated analysis, it cannot be determined that these results directly contradict True's conclusion. Future research could disaggregate the GII and compare the effects of female political representation, economic empowerment, and access to healthcare on NAP creation.

Lastly, the dichotomous dependent variable limited the type of insight statistical testing could provide. Until a dataset is developed that continuously or categorically measures the

quality of NAPs across time, any research on the trends in implementation will be limited in nuance and explanatory power. There are prospects for such a dataset as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom continues to expand its annual WPS Scorecard for assessing UNSC members.[75] Until such a dataset is available, exploratory quantitative analyses must be supplemented with in-depth, qualitative investigations. Such studies could focus on the differences between a small number of NAP and non-NAP countries, especially those within the same multilateral organizations.

Despite these drawbacks, the findings in this study build upon previous literature and have important implications regarding compliance with UNSCR 1325. Although the main hypothesis was rejected, the results of the tabulations support the norm life cycle theory. Before the tipping point in 2010, most of the countries that had adopted NAPs had low levels of gender inequality. Since low levels of gender inequality generally correlate with high levels of development, most of these countries were presumably highly influential and visible leaders. The first countries might also have implemented NAPs in part because of the cultural match between domestic gender equality values and the theme of Resolution 1325.

Notably, the first countries to adopt NAPs were also Western donor countries. These governments might have pushed for the creation of NAPs in countries receiving humanitarian or economic aid, reducing the importance of domestic cultural match for agreement implementation after the tipping point. This could potentially explain why so many countries with high gender disparities have NAPs. For example, Afghanistan has a high level of gender inequality and a weak democratic culture but also a high level of influence from international organizations and

[75] Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. "WPS Scorecard." http://peacewomen.org/scorecards (accessed 1/31/21).

donor states. Compliance might have also become a resource issue rather than one of values. Funding from developed countries and incentives in bilateral relations to create a NAP could influence national priorities, which would also explain why countries with the very highest levels of gender inequality are more likely than not to have a NAP. Countries with medium-range gender inequality likely did not attract pressure from the norm leaders, which could be why many of those states did not pass NAPs until later.

With this possibility in mind, countries with low cultural precedent for gender integration and mainstreaming may not necessarily be resistant to UNSCR 1325. Rather, compliance could now be an issue of framing the costs and benefits of creating a NAP or a practical matter of funding and institutional competence. Perhaps the governments in countries without NAPs simply do not feel pressured or incentivized to create one. Democratization efforts may even indirectly affect UNSCR 1325 compliance over time by changing a government's values and international social group. Even if every UN Member State eventually passes a NAP, further research must be conducted to determine how domestic norms matter —or begin to matter less— during the diffusion of international norms. A better understanding of the interaction and exchange between domestic and international norms could change the way international norm leaders promote compliance with individual countries.

Moreover, if domestic commitments to gender equality are not necessary for NAP implementation, efforts to integrate and mainstream women and gendered perspectives could be seriously undermined. Countries could create NAPs yet fail to sufficiently implement them, leading to a hollow WPS agenda. Mapping the trends of norm diffusion from compliance to implementation is important not just for UNSCR 1325 accountability, but for future international agreements regarding other human rights issues as well. Future research should build on the

findings from this study to investigate if NAPs created after the tipping point have resulted in lower average levels of gender inequality, how domestic norms interact with international norms, and how relationships between developed and developing countries have influenced NAP creation and implementation.

Conclusion

UNSCR 1325 was a hallmark resolution that is now the cornerstone of the international WPS agenda, yet less than half of all UN member states have created NAPs. Put differently, this group of states represents a little less than 3 billion people, or about 38% of the world population.[76] Some of the most populous states in the world, including China, India, and Pakistan, have yet to adopt a NAP. The gap in domestic diffusion could undermine the advancement of women's rights and integration of women into decision-making roles in political and military institutions around the world. Without state compliance with UNSCR 1325, progress toward sustainable peace agreements, more stable societies, and the elimination of violence against women will be slowed. Therefore, NAPs are crucial for state security and human security alike, especially as some of the most populous parts of the world begin to face more frequent humanitarian disasters and instability.

This study examined the broad, quantitative trends in the creation of NAPs, finding no significant relationship between the level of gender inequality in a country and the likelihood that a country has a NAP. Instead, the level of democratization of a country appeared to have a significant, positive effect on the likelihood of NAP creation. As a result of the self-reinforcing relationship between democracy and gender equality, democracy may be an important precursor

[76] "U.S. and World Population Clock." United States Census Bureau, March 2021. https://www.census.gov/popclock/world.

for NAP creation and the diffusion of domestic gender rights. However, democracy by itself does not guarantee reduced gender inequality, which means that NAP creation is just the beginning of UNSCR 1325 compliance and not necessarily the culmination of a rise in political, social, and economic gender equality.

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Curriculum Vita

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